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Abstract: This work addresses the security of a two-user broadcast channel. The challenge of protecting a
broadcast channel is associated with the necessity of securing the system, not only against eavesdropping
attacks originating from external nodes, but also to ensure that the inside users do not eavesdrop on each
other’s information. To address this issue, the present work proposes a cooperative jamming scheme
that provides protection against eavesdropping attacks carried out simultaneously by inside users and
external eavesdroppers. To achieve this goal, the developed scheme combines real interference alignment
with a blind cooperative jamming technique defined in the literature. An information theoretical
analysis shows that positive secure degrees of freedom are achievable using the proposed solution.
Keywords: broadcast channel; physical layer security; cooperative jamming; real interference alignment;
blind cooperative jamming
1. Introduction
In commercial wireless standards, protection against eavesdropping attacks has been provided by
cryptographic protocols [1,2]. Despite the large-scale proliferation of these protocols, confidentiality
is only achieved when the processing capabilities of the attacker are not sufficient to solve the
mathematical problems underlying these protocols. However, with the recent progress in the field
of quantum processing, some of these difficult mathematical problems will be solvable [3], making
the current cryptographic techniques less secure. A research line that has been followed to address
these new threats focuses on exploiting the random properties of the wireless channel with the aim of
developing advanced security functionalities at the physical layer [4–6]. Contrary to what happens
with commercial cryptosystems, in physical layer security, the secrecy performance is quantified
from an information theoretical perspective, not relying on any type of technological limitation at
the eavesdropper.
1.1. Motivation and Related Work
The exploitation of the wireless medium as a source of secrecy can be carried out in two different
ways. In the first, the internal dynamics of the channel can be used as a source of entropy to extract secret
keys [7,8]. A second approach involves the use of cooperative jamming to force the degradation of the
eavesdropper channel. In relation to cooperative jamming, a typical approach considers artificial noise
(AN) generation to impair the eavesdropper channel with continuous Gaussian signals. The work in [9]
shows that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved by sending AN in the null space (NS) direction of the
legitimate receiver. Although the solution in [9] does not require eavesdropper channel state information
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(CSI) at the legitimate nodes, an advantage on the number of antennas is required at the transmitting
side to create a null space. The impairment of the channel training phase with the execution of pilot
contamination attacks carried out by active eavesdroppers can be used to increase the capacity of the
wiretap channel. To address the secrecy capacity reduction caused by contaminated channel estimations,
the work in [10] explores the additional degrees of freedom of a massive multiple-input-multiple-output
(MIMO) system to impair the eavesdropper with AN. The authors of [10] analyzed the tradeoff between
performance and complexity of NS-based precoding and random shaping precoding, concluding that
the latter offers a good solution for AN generation. Considering a scenario where the cooperative
jammer is also the information source of a second receiver, the authors of [11] designed an AN jamming
solution to protect the first receiver, ensuring at the same time a specific quality-of-service at the
second. The integration of wireless powered communications with cooperative jamming was proposed
in [12]. Using first the base station as a power source and then as a cooperative jammer, a secrecy
rate maximization was performed in [12], computing optimal parameters for the jamming and energy
harvesting phases.
The development of cooperative secure communications to protect two-hop relay networks has
also been one of the most active research topics in the field of physical layer security. The authors of [13]
evaluated several precoding schemes to secure a MIMO relay network considering two cooperative
jamming configurations. In the full cooperative jamming configuration, both inactive and active nodes
transmit jamming signals; in the partial jamming configuration, only the inactive nodes are used as
jammers. An optimal relay selection algorithm was designed in [14] to secure a two-hop wireless
network in a scenario where an adaptive eavesdropper can also act as a malicious jammer. Similarly
to [14], protection against passive eavesdropping attacks is provided in [15] by selecting a pair of nodes
to perform the jamming and relaying functions. While [13–15] focus on decode-and-forward (DF)
relaying techniques, the authors of [16,17] considered the use of amplify-and-forward (AF) relays.
Following the theoretical insights of the real interference alignment framework defined in [18,19],
another important line of research was established with the results obtained in [20,21]. In real interference
alignment, the rational dimensions available in single antenna systems are used to set alignment
directions for data and interference. These directions are defined using rationally independent scalars as
precoding coefficients. By making a proper selection of these coefficients, different alignment conditions
between the jamming and information signals can be exploited to secure the system. According to the
findings of [20,21], positive secure degrees of freedom (DoF) are obtained if the jamming process is
designed with some structure. Through the alignment of discrete jamming signals with the information
signals at the eavesdropper, the work in [20] showed that positive secure DoF are achievable if the
eavesdropper CSI is available at the legitimate terminals. The same authors of [20] considered a more
realistic scenario in [21] where eavesdropper CSI is not available. In this second scenario, the authors
proposed a blind cooperative jamming solution, demonstrating that positive secure DoF can still be
achieved by spreading the jamming components across the signal space of the eavesdropper.
1.2. Contribution
The authors of [20,21] analyzed several network structures, including the wiretap channel, the
interference channel and the multiple access channel. The broadcast channel was solely evaluated
in [20] by considering a scenario where information leakage only occurs among legitimate users, i.e.,
not taking into account the presence of external eavesdroppers. In this type of channel, the interference
generated by the information sent to the other users must always be decoded by the receiver in order to
allow a correct acquisition of the intended data. Additionally, because this interference could represent
valuable information, it should remain confidential even among the terminals registered as legitimate
users inside the network. Please note that an eavesdropper could connect to the network as a fake
legitimate user only for the purpose of tapping the information sent to the other users. Therefore,
a robust secrecy solution should provide protection not only against attacks carried out by external
eavesdroppers, but also against attacks executed by terminals registered in the network as legitimate
Electronics 2020, 9, 496 3 of 12
users. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, securing a broadcast channel against eavesdropping
attacks carried out simultaneously by internal users and external eavesdroppers is an open problem
that remains untreated in the literature. To address this issue, the present work extends [20] by
providing a cooperative jamming solution that also protects a two-user broadcast channel against
passive eavesdropping attacks carried out by external terminals. To achieve this goal, the developed
scheme combines real interference alignment with the concept of blind cooperative jamming defined
in [21]. An information theoretical analysis shows that positive secure DoF are achievable with the
proposed solution.
1.3. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the system model, while
Section 3 defines some preliminaries on real interference alignment. The cooperative jamming solution
proposed in this manuscript is formulated in Section 4 and evaluated in Section 5. Some practical
challenges are discussed in Section 6. The main conclusions are outlined in Section 7.
Notation: The discrete entropy of the random variable X is denoted by H(X), and the continuous
differential entropy by h(X). The notation I [X; Y] refers to the mutual information between X and
Y, while the expected value of X is represented by E[X]. A vector comprising n realizations of X is
denoted by Xn, and o [ f (x)] defines the little-o notation.
2. System Model
The communication model considered in this work is illustrated in Figure 1. Node “A” pretends
to transmit two confidential messages to users “B0” and “B1”. Additionally, a passive eavesdropper
denoted by “E” tries to obtain the information sent to both users. This work also assumes that “B0”
and “B1” are eavesdroppers of each other. To enhance the security level of the system, two jammers
represented by “J0” and “J1” cooperate with “A”, generating two independent jamming signals. All
the terminals have a single antenna. The channel gains are real and remain static during the entire
communication phase. Furthermore, this work also assumes that the channels of the different users are
independently sampled from a continuous known distribution. Finally, this model assumes that the
channel of the eavesdropper “E” is the only one that is not known by the remaining terminals.
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Figure 1. System model.
Defining XT as the channel input of transmitter T ∈ {A, J0, J1}, and assuming an average power
constraint E [X2T] < P, the signals observed at the receiving nodes R ∈ {B0, B1, E} are formulated as
YB0 = hB0AXA + hB0 J0XJ0 + hB0 J1XJ1 +NB0 (1)
YB1 = hB1AXA + hB1 J0XJ0 + hB1 J1XJ1 +NB1 (2)
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YE = hEAXA + hEJ0XJ0 + hEJ1XJ1 +NE (3)
The channel gain between terminal R and T is denoted by the coefficient hRT, while noise at the
receiving node R is defined by random variable NR, which follows a zero-mean Gaussian distribution
with variance σ2NR . In this work, node “A” wants to transmit, in secrecy, message WB0 to node “B0”,
and message WB1 to node “B1”. In the case of WB0 , secrecy implies that the message is either protected
against eavesdropping attacks carried out by “E” or “B1”. Similarly, the message WB1 is secured if
neither node “E” nor node “B0” is capable of decoding the respective information. The messages are
independent and chosen uniformly from the setsWB0 andWB1 .
Before the transmission, each message is mapped into a codeword of length n using the encoding
functions fB0 :WB0 → VnB0 and fB1 :WB1 → VnB1 . In each channel use, XA is computed combining
the codeword elements VB0 and VB1 with a jamming component UA, resulting in the following
transmitted signal
XA = w0VB0 +w1VB1 +w2UA (4)
At nodes “J0” and “J1”, two jamming components UJ0 and UJ1 are also generated and transmitted
using the signals
XJ0 = w3UJ0 (5)
XJ1 = w4UJ1 (6)
The coefficient wi, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} denotes a channel dependent precoder that is specified in Section 4.
After the encoding phase, each message is transmitted across n channel uses at the following rates
RB0 =
1
n
log2
∣∣∣WB0 ∣∣∣ (7)
RB1 =
1
n
log2
∣∣∣WB1 ∣∣∣ (8)
where
∣∣∣WB0 ∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣WB1 ∣∣∣ define the cardinality of the setsWB0 andWB1 , respectively. After sampling
the channel output n times, “B0” decodes YnB0 and obtains an estimation of WB0 , which is denoted by
WˆB0 . In a similar way, “B1” computes WˆB1 after decoding Y
n
B1
. The rate pair
(
RB0 , RB1
)
is achievable if
for any > 0 there exists an n-length code such that the probability of decoding error is given by
Pe
[
WB0 , WˆB0
]
≤  (9)
Pe
[
WB1 , WˆB1
]
≤  (10)
Furthermore, at the same time, WB0 and WB1 are transmitted in perfect secrecy if
1
n
min
{
H(WB0
∣∣∣YB1), H(WB0 ∣∣∣YE)} ≥ 1nH(WB0) −  (11)
1
n
min
{
H(WB1
∣∣∣YB0), H(WB1 ∣∣∣YE)} ≥ 1nH(WB1) −  (12)
The conditions in (9)–(12) can be mutually achieved if the rate pair
(
RB0 , RB1
)
belongs to the
capacity region of the system. The proof of achievability can be performed using random code
constructions featuring codeword lengths with n→∞ . In the remainder of this work, it is assumed
that the codebooks and encoding functions fB0 and fB1 at all terminals are known.
3. Preliminaries
This section presents a lemma that has been applied in the DoF analysis of different network
structures. This lemma is a fundamental tool in the field of real interference alignment [18,19], being
used to demonstrate that the fractional dimensions offered by single antenna systems can be exploited
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to manage interference. In this work, this lemma is applied in the DoF analysis of the proposed
cooperative jamming solution. The considered lemma was used in [20] to derive an upper bound on
the probability of error of the following multi-layer constellation
X =
L0∑
i=1
gici (13)
where
{
gi
}L0
i=1 denotes a set composed by L0 rationally independent real numbers, and {ci}L0i=1 defines L0
information streams independently sampled from
C(a, Q) = a{−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (14)
The ensemble C(a, Q) represents a set of 2Q + 1 real numbers, where parameter a defines the
distance between consecutive points. The probability of decoding error is derived for an additive
noise channel
Y = X +N (15)
where N denotes Gaussian noise with variance σ2N, and X defines a set of (2Q+ 1)
L0 real points
featuring an average power constraint E
[
X2
]
< P. The considered lemma states the following:
Lemma 1. For any small enough δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which is independent of P, such that
if we select the parameters
Q = P
1−δ
2(L1+δ) and a = γ
√
P
Q
(16)
then the average power constraint E [X2] ≤ P is satisfied, and for almost all {gi}L0i=1, except for a set of Lebesgue
measure zero (probability of the event arbitrarily close to zero), the probability of error is upper bounded by
Pe ≤ exp
(
−ηγPξ
)
(17)
where ηγ is a positive constant independent of P, and the condition ξ > 0 is always verified for L1 ≥ L0.
Lemma 1 is supported by the Khintchine–Groshev theorem [18,19], which defines a lower bound on
the minimal distance between consecutive points of (13). The theorem states that when the information
streams {ci}L0i=1 are drawn from the set C(a, Q), there exists a constant kδ such that for any δ > 0, the
minimal distance between the (2Q+ 1)L0 points of X can be lower bounded by
dmin ≥ kδaQL0−1+δ (18)
The Khintchine–Groshev theorem can be extended to the case where the terms of {ci}L0i=1 are drawn
from different sets Ci(a, Qi). In this case, the minimal distance between the
∏L0
i=1 (2Qi + 1) points of X
is lower bounded in the following way:
dmin ≥ kδa
(maxiQi)
L0−1+δ (19)
The result formulated in Lemma 1 is applied in the DoF analysis of the cooperative jamming
solution proposed in this work. In the real domain, a DoF pair is formulated as
DB0 = limP→∞
RB0
2 log2(P)
DB1 = limP→∞
RB1
2 log2(P)
(20)
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where P denotes a channel input power constraint, and the pair (RB0 , RB1) comprises achievable secrecy
rates for nodes “B0” and “B1”.
4. Security Scheme
The cooperative jamming solution proposed in this work is developed in the context of the
theoretical framework described in Section 3. Accordingly, in the following, we assume that the signals{
VB0 , VB1 , UA, UJ0 , UJ1
}
are mutually independent and are sampled from C(a, Q) in (14), applying
the parameters
Q = P
1−δ
2(3+δ) and a = γ
√
P
Q
(21)
After the encoding phase, the jamming and the information signals are linearly precoded and
transmitted using the following signals:
XA =
1
hB1A
VB0 +
hB0 J0
hB1 J0hB0A
VB1 +
hB0 J1
hB1 J1hB0A
UA (22)
XJ0 =
1
hB1 J0
UJ0 (23)
XJ1 =
1
hB1 J1
UJ1 (24)
Please note that in (22)–(24), the precoding coefficients wi, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} are designed without
using the channel gains of the external eavesdropper “E”, which complies with the passive condition
defined for this terminal. For the channel model formulated in (1)–(3), the signals observed at the
channel output are defined as
YB0 =
hB0A
hB1A
VB0 +
hB0 J0
hB1 J0
[
VB1 +UJ0
]
+
hB0 J1
hB1 J1
[
UA +UJ1
]
+NB0 (25)
YB1 =
[
VB0 +UJ0 +UJ1
]
+
hB1AhB0 J0
hB0AhB1 J0
VB1 +
hB1AhB0 J1
hB0AhB1 J1
UA +NB1 (26)
YE =
hEA
hB1A
VB0 +
hEAhB0 J0
hB0AhB1 J0
VB1 +
hEAhB0 J1
hB0AhB1 J1
UA +
hEJ0
hB1 J0
UJ0 +
hEJ1
hB1 J1
UJ1 +NE (27)
The developed solution protects “B0” from the eavesdropping attacks of “B1”, forcing the alignment
of VB0 with UJ0 +UJ1 at the channel output of “B1”. At node “B0”, the information intended for “B1” is
also secured with the alignment of VB1 with UJ0 . In the case of node “E”, it is not possible to explicitly
align VB0 and VB1 with any jamming signal. However, as demonstrated in [21], secrecy against node
“E” is still achievable by filling the signal space of node “E” with enough jamming signals. As it is
demonstrated in Section 5, positive secure DoF are achievable using the secrecy solution proposed in
this work.
5. Secrecy Analysis
The secrecy analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in the following using the limits
formulated in (20) as the evaluation metric. For the reliability and secrecy constraints defined in
equations (9)–(12), the following secrecy rates
RB0 ≥ I
[
VB0 ; YB0
]
−max
{
I
[
VB0 ; YB1
∣∣∣VB1 ]; I [VB0 ; YE∣∣∣VB1 ]} (28)
RB1 ≥ I
[
VB1 ; YB1
]
−max
{
I
[
VB1 ; YB0
∣∣∣VB0 ]; I [VB1 ; YE∣∣∣VB0 ]} (29)
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are achievable using the random encoding schemes defined in [22]. In order to derive an achievable
DoF pair, all the mutual information terms in (28) and (29) are computed in this section. The main
result of the theoretical analysis performed in this work is formalized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The secure DoF pair (DB0 , DB1) = (1/3, 1/3) is achievable using the cooperative jamming scheme
formulated in Section 4.
Proof. See Sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
As stated above, in the asymptotical power regime of (20), fractional secure DoF can be reached
by applying the cooperative jamming scheme developed in this work. The demonstration of Theorem
1 is provided in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
5.1. DoF Characterization at “B0”
The derivation of the achievable DoF at node “B0” is presented in this subsection. To accomplish
this, theoretical bounds on the mutual information terms of (28) are defined in Lemmas 2–4.
Introducing Lemma 2 first, a lower bound on the amount of legitimate information obtained by
node “B0” is formalized as follows:
Lemma 2. For any δ > 0, the amount of information VB0 that node “B0” obtains from the observation of YB0 is
lower bounded by
I
[
VB0 ; YB0
]
≥
( 1− δ
3+ δ
)1
2
log2(P) − o
[
log2(P)
]
(30)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
Lemma 2 was computed applying the theoretical tools provided by the real interference alignment
framework described in Section 3, namely, Lemma 1. The amount of information intended for node
“B0” that is eavesdropped by “B1” is quantified in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. The amount of information VB0 that node “B1” obtains from the observation of YB1 is given by
I
[
VB0 ; YB1
∣∣∣VB1 ] = o [log2(P)] (31)
Proof. Because VB0 is aligned with UJ0 +UJ1 in (26), “B0” can only obtain information about VB0 from
the observation of VB0 +UJ0 +UJ1 . Therefore, the following upper bound
I
[
VB0 ; YB1
∣∣∣VB1 ] ≤ I [VB0 ; VB0 +UJ0 +UJ1]
≤ I
[
VB0 ; VB0 +UJ0
]
= o
[
log2(P)
] (32)
can be computed assuming a noiseless and non-interference regime in (26). As demonstrated in [23],
I
[
VB0 ; VB0 +UJ0
]
< 1 bits, leading to the result in (31). 
To complete the secure DoF characterization at “B0”, an upper bound on the amount of information
VB0 obtained by node “E” is formulated in Lemma 4. As in Lemma 2, the computation of Lemma 4
was performed using the theoretical framework defined in Section 3.
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Lemma 4. For any δ > 0, the amount of information VB0 that node “E” obtains from the observation of YE is
defined by
I
[
VB0 ; YE
∣∣∣VB1 ] ≤ [ 4δ3+ δ ]12 log2 P+ o [log2(P)] (33)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
According to Lemma 1, the value of δ in (30) and (33) can be made arbitrarily close to zero.
Therefore, applying Lemmas 2–4 to (28) and (20), it is possible to conclude that DB0 = 1/3 is achievable
at node “B0”.
5.2. DoF Characterization at “B1”
The DoF characterization at node “B1” is presented in the following. As demonstrated in
Section 5.1, all the mutual information terms of (29) are analyzed in this subsection. Again using the
framework described in Section 3, a lower bound on the amount of information VB1 obtained by node
“B1” is defined in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. For any δ > 0, the amount of information VB1 that node “B1” obtains from the observation of YB1 is
lower bounded by
I
[
VB1 ; YB1
]
≥
( 1− δ
3+ δ
)1
2
log2(P) − o
[
log2(P)
]
(34)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in Section 5.1, only the equivalent channel gains are different. 
Lemma 6 quantifies an upper bound on the total information VB1 acquired by “B0” when the
channel output in (25) is observed.
Lemma 6. The amount of information VB1 that node “B0” obtains from the observation of YB0 is given by
I
[
VB1 ; YB0
∣∣∣VB0 ] = o [log2(P)] (35)
Proof. Because VB1 is aligned with UJ0 in (25), “B0” only obtains information about VB1 from the
observation of VB1 +UJ0 . Therefore, the following upper bound
I
[
VB1 ; YB0
∣∣∣VB0 ] ≤ I [VB1 ; VB1 +UJ0]
= o
[
log2(P)
] (36)
can be computed assuming a noiseless and non-interference regime in (25). As demonstrated in [23],
I
[
VB0 ; VB0 +UJ0
]
< 1 bits, leading to the result in (35). 
The leakage of information VB1 at node “E” is upper bounded in Lemma 7. As shown in Lemma
4, the theoretical framework defined in Section 3 was again applied to build Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. For any δ > 0, the amount of information VB1 that node “E” obtains from the observation of YE is
upper bounded by
I
[
VB1 ; YE
∣∣∣VB0 ] ≤ [ 4δ3+ δ ]12 log2 P+ o [log2(P)] (37)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4 in Section 5.1. 
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The achievability of DB1 = 1/3 follows from Lemmas 5–7, (29) and (20). After this final step, the
proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
6. Discussion
Although this work considers a static channel environment, in a real scenario, the channel is
always dynamic and therefore must be measured periodically. In a dynamic channel context, a practical
execution of the proposed scheme would require the implementation of a channel training phase for
each new realization of the channel. This channel training phase would comprise an initial stage for
pilot transmission, which would be carried out by all the terminals with the exception of node “E”.
Then, a channel feedback stage would be performed in order to provide each node with the necessary
information to set the alignment conditions and to allow the decoding process at “B0” and “B1”. Due
to the large number of channel gains that must be known at each terminal, one of the main challenges
associated with the practical implementation of the proposed scheme is related to the complexity and
overhead associated with the channel training phase. These requirements stem from the alignment
conditions that need to be met to ensure the security requirements. We should point out that this issue
is not specific to the proposed scheme, being widely recognized as a general problem in the field of
real interference alignment, particularly when these types of techniques are applied to large multiuser
networks. To address the practical constraints mentioned above, efficient channel training methods
must be designed to enable the practical implementation of such technology.
7. Conclusions
A physical layer security solution employing two cooperative jammers was developed in this
work by combining the concepts of real interference alignment and blind cooperative jamming.
The proposed scheme complements the related literature by protecting a two-user broadcast channel
against simultaneous internal and external eavesdropping attacks. An information theoretical analysis
of the developed solution showed that in a high signal to noise ratio (SNR) regime, a secure DoF of 1/3
is achieved at each user.
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Appendix A
The proof of Lemma 2 is derived in the following. For convenience, Lemma 2 is repeated here.
Lemma 2. For any δ > 0, the amount of information VB0 that node “B0” obtains from the observation of YB0 is
defined by
I
[
VB0 ; YB0
]
≥
( 1− δ
3+ δ
)1
2
log2(P) − o
[
log2(P)
]
(A1)
Proof. Applying the theoretical framework described in Section 3, a lower bound on the amount of
information VB0 obtained by “B0” can be derived as follows
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I
[
VB0 ; YB0
]
= H
(
VB0
)
−H
(
VB0
∣∣∣YB0 )
(a)≥ log2(2Q+ 1) −
[
1+ Pe log2(2Q+ 1)
]
(b)≥ log2
(
P
1−δ
2(3+δ)
)
− exp
(
−ηγPξ
)
log2
(
P
1−δ
2(3+δ)
)
− 1
(c)
=
(
1−δ
3+δ
)
1
2 log2(P) − o
[
log2(P)
]
(A2)
The Fano inequality in [24] is applied to step (a), while Lemma 1 is used in (b). Note that the
equivalent channel coefficients in (25) are rationally independent. Therefore, according to Lemma 1,
for L1 = 3 the upper bound on the probability of error defined in (17) can be applied to the channel
output of “B0”, which validates (b). Additionally, since the last two terms of (b) do not scale with
log2 P, the final result in (c) holds. 
Appendix B
The proof of Lemma 4 is derived in this section. For simplification purposes, in the following let
us assume that
U =
[
UA UJ0 UJ1
]
(A3)
denotes a vector containing all the jamming signals used by the proposed scheme. Additionally,
variable Y′E is also defined as
Y′E =
hEA
hB1A
VB0 +
hEAhB0 J1
hB0AhB1 J1
UA +
hEJ0
hB1 J0
UJ0 +
hEJ1
hB1 J1
UJ1 +NE (A4)
For convenience, Lemma 4 is repeated here.
Lemma 4. For any δ > 0, the amount of information VB0 that node “E” obtains from the observation of YE is
defined by
I
[
VB0 ; YE
∣∣∣VB1 ] ≤ [ 4δ3+ δ ]12 log2 P+ o [log2(P)] (A5)
Proof. Again using the framework defined in Section 3, an upper bound on the amount of information
VB0 obtained by “E” is derived as follows:
I
[
VB0 ; YE
∣∣∣VB1 ] = I [VB0 , U; YE∣∣∣VB1 ]− I [U; YE∣∣∣VB0 ,VB1]
(d)
= I
[
VB0 , U; YE
∣∣∣VB1 ]− [H(U∣∣∣VB0 ,VB1)−H(U∣∣∣YE, VB0 ,VB1)]
(e)≤ I
[
VB0 , U; YE
∣∣∣VB1 ]−H(U∣∣∣VB0 ,VB1)+ o(log2 P)
= h
(
YE
∣∣∣VB1 )− h(YE∣∣∣VB0 , VB1 , U)−H(U) + o(log2 P)
= h
(
Y′E
)
− h(NE) −H(U) + o
(
log2 P
)
( f )≤ h
(
Y′E
)
−H(U) + o
(
log2 P
)
= h
(
Y′E
)
− log2(2Q+ 1)3 + o
(
log2 P
)
≤ h
(
Y′E
)
− log2 Q3 + o
(
log2 P
)
(g)≤ 12 log2
(
2pieσ2
)
− log2 Q3 + o
(
log2 P
)
(h)≤ 12 log2 P− log2 Q3 + o
(
log2 P
)
(i)≤ 12 log2 P− log2 P
3
2 [
1−δ
3+δ ] + o
(
log2 P
)
= 12 log2 P−
[
3(1−δ)
3+δ
]
1
2 log2 P+ o
(
log2 P
)
=
[
4δ
3+δ
]
1
2 log2 P+ o
(
log2 P
)
(A6)
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Step (e) results from the joint application of the Fano inequality [24] and Lemma 1 to the last term
of step (d). Because the variance of NE is finite and independent of P, the differential entropy of NE
does not scale with log2 P, which validates ( f ). Moreover, defining σ
2 as the variance of Y′E in (A4),
an upper bound on h
(
Y′E
)
is derived in (g) by applying the closed form solution for the differential
entropy of a normal distribution with variance σ2. The upper bound in (h) is valid since σ2 only scales
with the average power at the channel input, which is constrained to P according to Lemma 1. Finally,
step (i) is obtained by setting Q with the value defined in (21). 
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